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FORUM

Reflections And Recommendations On The Teaching Of
Professional Responsibility
by Judy Goldenberg

I hear, and I forget;
I see, and I remember;
I do, and I understand.
Old Chinese Proverb
Current methods for instilling professionalism in law students leave
something to be desired in the judgment of nearly all observers. To date,
no techniques have achieved substantial success in raising the level of
awareness or increasing the ability of
students and attorneys to resolve ethical dilemmas arising in the multifaceted practice of law. One study by
Columbia University's Wanger
Thielens concluded through empirical data measuring changes in ethical
responses of students from four law
schools in the Class of 1964, that each
class at each school would have a net
addition of only thirteen more members out of each 200 graduates adhering to each value than they had at
entrance.
Legal education is graduate study:
students are adults. One view is that
ethical training at this point in a person's life is too late. Proponents of
this view believe that moral character
is malleable only at an early age and
that the value systems which underpin ethical judgments (or explain the
lack of them) are so deep-seated in
adults as to be immutable... people
have it, or they do not. Restructuring
adult personalities, if not impossible,
would be so costly as to be at least
unpractical. Professors adopting this
view can and do justifiably argue that
a course at the law school level in
ethics is absolutely superfluous since
students' attitudes will be nearly impossible to change. In fact, some have
suggested that the only useful role
the law school can play in this area is
to develop an efficient screening tech-

nique for determining students' character qualifications prior to their admission to the law program.
A second view is that behavior in
ethically charged situations is more
likely to be a response to pressures in
the environment than an expression
of an individual's values and ethical
judgment. (Stanley Milgram and Philip
Zimbardo, psychologists, have created
experimental clinical settings to study
the effects of conflicts arising between
'ethical' people and stressful environments. Their conclusions: Many
people, perhaps the majority, can be
made to do almost anything when put
into psychologically compelling situations - regardless of their morals,
ethics, values, beliefs, or personal
convictions.) Therefore, to those who
adopt this perspective, the relevant
questions are not: How much knowledge of the rules does a person have?
What values does a person hold?
Where did they come from? Can they
be changed? Rather, the relevant question is: What are the environmental
stresses that cause people to act ethically or unethically? Again, professors adopting this view argue that
ethical instruction would have little
effect upon law students who, when
later, as professionals, are faced with
daily potentially stressful situations,
would act in a manner completely
disdainful of the lessons in morality
they had so diligently 'learned'.
Two other psychologists, Jean Piaget
and Lawrence Kohlberg, have conducted research the results of which
suggest that ethical judgment is a
function of individual moral growth,
with each level transcending the preceding stages and providing a new
way of thinking about the world and
the place of the person in it. Childhood is recognized as an important

state in learning, but it does not, as
may be popularly believed, cast the
die for all time. Kohlberg has labeled
moral judgment as having three general levels: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. Typically
adults develop only to the modes of
reasoning characterized as conventional - pleasing others and rule
obedience. Only persons in the stage
of post-conventional reasoning would
be likely to resist situational pressures leading to unethical actions.
The view arising from this theory
is that moral reasoning is learned, but
not through standard law school techniques of lectures, memorization and
Socratic dialogue. Rather, for students/
lawyers to achieve postconventional
heights of reasoning, they must actively
participate in group processes involving ethical questions and personally
engage in the resolution of role conflicts. Numerous professors expounding this belief have argued that clinical legal education exemplifies such a
mode, and all agree that traditional
classroom methods fail to accomplish
this desired objective. They would
support Piaget's contention that learning, indeed the development of intelligence itself, is a continuous process
of assimilating the external facts of
experience and integrating them into
the individual's internal mental structures. The activity is crucial: the child,
or for that matter the adult, must
discover understanding for himself.
This last view stands alone in holding
out a positive message: teachers of
professional responsibility courses can
inculcate their students with those
values and skills necessary to function as 'complete' lawyers and human
beings.
As Savoy noted in his 1974 Yale
Law Journal article, Toward A New

Politics of Legal Education, "There is not a
single lawyer I know with whom I
went to law school who feels that his
legal education adequately prepared
him for the practice of law (or anything else for that matter). My experience in one of the larger postgraduate educational institutions in
America - the New York District
Attorney's Office -was sobering.
Trying to reconstruct an incident
from interviews with witnesses;
awakening to the ritualistic performance of police officers on the witness stand; plumbing the subtleties of
the plea-bargaining process; learning
the nuances of communication between judges and attorneys, I became
suddenly aware of the unforgiveable
irrelevance of my legal education to
what was happening in my head, in
the courtroom, and in the streets of
our cities. The first case I tried was a
numbing experience. My only consolation was that the Legal Aid Lawyer
who represented the defendant was
as woefully untutored as I."
We can safely presume that law
school administrators are aware, to at
least some degree, that this problem
of law school graduates' inability to
'handle' the law exists. Why then
don't they assure that their students
are taught how to function in a lawyerly manner? Various analysts have
suggested that the answer lies with
the composition of the law school
faculty itself.
One possibility is that many professors do not know personally what
it is that lawyers do, and how they do
it since they were chosen to teach in
large part on the basis of academic
credentials, not experience. The transition from student to teacher is sometimes made directly, with no time in
between to get practical know how
'downtown'. (In fact, in some cases
there are professors teaching because
the idea of practicing is somehow
frightening or distasteful to them.)
Those who have had practical experience will ordinarily have served in
very large firms with high status
(courtesy of their former position as
members of a law review editorial
board), far removed from the kind of
practice which will realistically occupy

most law school graduates. Such instructors cannot be expected to teach
someone else how to 'lawyer', if they
have never done so themselves.
Another possibility is that law professors play an old game called "that's
out of my field". They contend that
the way lawyers conduct their practices, what they say and do with clients,
judges and clerks, is a combination of
common sense, instinct, psychology,
intuition, and experience that no law
school can hope to teach. Such an
argument can be a 'copout' for not
providing a necessary practical dimension to the curriculum. The fact
that some components of professional
'savvy' are not teachable is no excuse
for not teaching those which are. It
has also been suggested that the
background of law faculty members-

the cause of academic freedom in
behalf of colleagues and students alike."
Surely, this means that the law faculty,
regardless of academic background,
past practical experience and/or present extracurricular activities, be made
to live up to their position and accept
responsibility for preparing a greater
percentage of the law student body
analytically and practically -in knowledge of the law and what to do with
it-for their imminent entry into the
law arena.
Despite the widespread course work,
now of several years duration, the
optimum method of instruction in
legal ethics and professional responsibility has not as yet been settled and
agreed upon. For example, there is
still debate whether the course should
be introduced in the first year of law

intellectually elite scholars-makes
them feel more comfortable with current students who are in the same
category. That is, they tend to address
themselves and the content of their
courses to those who 'speak their language'. Unfortunately, when professors direct their teaching toward the
upper ten percent of the class, such a
technique may be termed professionally irresponsible, since the other
ninety percent will receive dubious
future benefit from their law school
studies. To avoid such a pitfall, Dean
McKay of New York University has
proposed that there be instituted a
series of guidelines for the conduct of
lawyers primarily acting as law
teachers. He has appropriately labeled
them "Canons of Ethics for Law
Teachers" and styled them after the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In fact, Cannon Three of his doctrine
reads: "A law teacher should promote

school since, by the time the student
reaches his second or third year, his
thoughts as to the legal profession
have probably begun to crystalize. In
addition, the upper level student is
often more concerned with other law
courses because the professional responsibility class is worth fewer credit
hours and impliedly requires less preparation while the first year student is
not so cynical and is generally more
inclined to enter into discussions due
to the psychological need for feedback.
On the other hand, as the late Professor Currie has written, "training
for professional responsibility and for
awareness of the role of law in society
is not a matter that can be parcelled
out and assigned to certain members
of the faculty at certain hours, but is
the job of all law teachers all of the
time." The factor determining the
success of this approach is the willingness of the law school faculty, in
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toto, to adopt it. It is unlikely that
professors who, for one valid reason
or another, do not support the idea
will provide pervasive teaching experiences for their students. Unless an
administrative watchdog policy is
strictly enforced, the program will fail
for inconsistency.
Of greater import than the question of when the course should be
offered, are the issues surrounding
the actual content or scope of the subject to be taught. Judge Joiner of
Michigan has stated that law schools
lack lawyer models for their students.
His thesis is that practitioners and/or
judges should be utilized as adjunct
faculty members to augment current
courses which he believes are not
explaining, defining or teaching what
lawyers should do. Needed, at minimum, is a three credit-hour course
that provides the 'stuff' of law practice within the context of the presently mandatory Canons of Professional Responsibility-fee schedules,
advertising, setting up a solo practice,
et. al.-and beyond the realm of the
Code-interviewing, handling, and
counseling clients, drafting techniques, practice in filing papers, familiarity with local standardized court
and clerk procedures, etc. Simulation
exercises and analysis of problems
provide a starting point, but there is
much more to be done. As the University of Maryland Law School's
Dean Kelly indicates in Legal Ethics and
Legal Education, "the legal ethics course
will always be viewed as a problem
child in the curriculum as a 'Mickey
Mouse' subject to students, until it
engages the challenges in practice of
the complex interactions of law, practical judgment and moral sentiment."

Solidarity Day:
Where Were The Lawyers?
by Stanley Janor
Graduate lawyers, by personal inclination and/or training, are usually
fairly humanistic and generalistic in
their thinking. Unfortunately, a large
percentage of them eventually sell
out for the big bucks gained by the
dehumanizing process of specialization, generally in some field which
often runs counter to, rather than
with, the public's interests. Do we not
owe them, the same public whose
money and faith supports our government and legal system, something
more? We are uniquely suited, blessed
even, by our legal education to seek
solutions to widely diverse problems.
In such a complex society, and with a
supposed "government of laws, not
of men", who should be better able to
govern than lawyers? Yet, it is hard
to remember an administration so
thoroughly dominated by one-minded
technocrats and close-minded idealogues with nary a lawyer in sightexcept for Reagan's former personal
tax-shelter consultant, Attorney (and
I use the term loosely) General William French Smith. Where are the
lawyers? Many of them, no doubt,
are laying back and licking their chops
in anticipation of higher retainers
from the corporations and wealthy
individuals who will be like pigs in a
sewage plant under the new tax laws.
Those with any social consciousness
have been neatly hamstrung by the
totality of the change wrought by this
weak-willed Congress. There is virtually nothing left to save and little
which could be changed through litigation. What, then, can be done? Privately, lawyers must alter their view
of themselves from profiteers to servants of the public and its legal system. Publicly, lawyers must reassert
their traditions of integrity, humanism, and generalism so that the
majority of people might once again
accept their leadership. The present
situation of the so-called experts being
"on top" rather than "on tap" as they
should be is socially and politically

intolerable. Lawyers must step forward to help cure the ills of the nation
that they were so instrumental in
founding and shaping, or watch the
once magnificent body they created
slowly die around them.
Even to a person inclined by disposition and profession to view most
events dispassionately and analytically,
the sight of a quarter-million people
on the Capitol Mall was emotionally
stirring. The composition of the crowd
was even more heartening. It wasn't
just kids, living off Mommy and Daddy's money, blowing off steam and
skipping classes. It wasn't just the
poor, purportedly living off taxpayers' money, asking for even more.
The crowd was Mommy and Daddy,
definitely taxpayers-as one writer
so aptly put it "Mr. and Mrs. America
crying ouch!" When such people, who
probably never protested anything in
their lives (who, in fact, probably
denounced those who did) march in
the streets of Washington, the political and social significance is inestimable and cannot be ignored.
Equally significant, and disappointingly so, was the absence of any
banners saying "State Bar Association" or even "Attorneys Against Voo
Doo Economics." The reasons for this
void run the gamut from the general
overall affluence of lawyers, many
being members of the monied conservative establishment that Reaganomics will benefit most, to the undeniable truism that lawyers are always needed to work with the law, no
matter how unjust it might be. Such
reasons, however, are as simplistic,
selfish, and narrow-minded as the
current administration and the policies which it is inflicting on the American Citizen.
Lawyers suffered perhaps their
worst image-damaging era ever under
Tricky Dicky and his California Mafia,
most of whom, sad to say, were law
school graduates. Collectively, they
stamped the term "scheister" so indel-

